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Abstract 
Discrimination, narratives and family history: 
An experiment with Jordanian host and Syrian refugee children * 
 
We measure the prevalence of discrimination between Jordanian host and Syrian 
refugee children attending school in Jordan. Using a simple sharing experiment, 
we find only little discrimination. Among the Jordanian children, however, we see 
that those who descended from Palestinian refugees do not discriminate at all, 
suggesting that a family history of refugee status can generate solidarity with 
new refugees. We also find that parents’ narratives about the refugee crisis are 
correlated with the degree of discrimination, suggesting that discriminatory pref-
erences are being transmitted through parental attitudes. 
 
 
Keywords: Discrimination, refugees, children, experiment, integration 
 
JEL classification: C91, D90, J15, C93, J13
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1 Introduction 
 
Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 over 650,000 Syrian refugees have sought 
shelter in Jordan and registered with UNHCR1. The resulting sudden increase in the population 
size of around 10% has put enormous strain on Jordan’s resource-poor economy, in particular 
on its water resources, waste management, housing stock, and the labor market (see, among 
others, Proktor 2014, Stave and Hillesund 2015, Francis 2015, and Razzaz 2017).2  
With the war dragging on, 2019 was the ninth year of the conflict and most Syrian 
refugees in Jordan had no plans to return to Syria. The majority appear likely to stay for decades 
to come3 – just as previous refugees from Iraq and, above all, Palestine did. Their successful 
integration into Jordanian society has thus become a matter of prime importance for the 
country’s stability in a fragile region. 
We investigate two factors that may generate frictions for the integration of refugees into 
society: (i) the prevalence of discrimination in both the refugee and the host population, and 
(ii) the perception of facts and prevailing narratives pertaining to the consequences of the 
refugee influx. We study discrimination among Syrian and Jordanian children who, in all 
likelihood, will have to live together in Jordan for the long run. Since economic preferences 
seem to develop early in life (e.g., Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach 2008) and discrimination 
across different (ethnic or language) groups has been shown to emerge fairly early on (see, e.g., 
Bindra, Glätzle-Rützler, and Lergetporer 2020), studying discrimination by and against refugee 
children will help to better understand the roots of potential discrimination and may thus inform 
possible policy interventions for successful integration. Besides studying children’s 
discriminatory behavior, we examine their parents’ narratives about the consequences of Syrian 
immigration and can hence assess the influence of parents’ attitudes on their children’s degree 
of discrimination. Complementing our analysis of parental attitudes, we study whether a family 
history of refugee status can generate solidarity with new refugees. We do this by evaluating 
the influence of being a descendant of Palestinian refugees on discriminatory behavior. 
In our experiment, we study two sharing tasks and one allocation task with a total of 456 
children, aged 9 to 10 years. A novel feature of our study is that we can explore discrimination 
                                                            
1 The Jordanian government reports that they host a total of 1.4 million Syrian refugees as many have not been 
registered. 
2 A dissenting view is presented in Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba (2019) who estimate the impact of the refugee influx 
on the labor market outcomes of Jordanians using panel data from 2010 to 2016 and report that Jordanians in areas 
with higher concentrations of refugees experienced no worse labor market outcomes than those in areas with lower 
concentrations. 
3 A scenario-based analysis on Syrian refugee return patterns can be found in Onder and Sayed (2019). 
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both against and by refugee children in a naturally arising, controlled and symmetric setting, 
namely that of Jordanian double-shift schools. Such schools are effectively operating two 
schools under one roof – one in the morning for Jordanians and one in the afternoon for Syrians 
(Albert et al. 2017). More than 200 double-shift schools were established in Jordan to manage 
the integration of Syrian refugee children into its education system. We ran the experimental 
sessions within such double-shift schools with children from the morning and the afternoon 
shift, allowing us to measure their social preferences towards their in-group and out-group. In 
addition, we collected survey data from all children and a large subset of their parents in order 
to assess the influence of some relevant aspects of the child’s family background.  
To the best of our knowledge our study is the first to explore discriminatory choice 
behavior against and by refugee children in an experimental setting. Note also that in our setting 
ethnic differences between the refugee and host population are comparatively small and that 
there are no language barriers. As such, our study comes close to identifying a pure refugee 
status effect on discrimination. 
Overall, we find that discrimination in both populations is strikingly low while overall 
levels of generosity are remarkably high. However, there are several intriguing details. First, 
looking at the host country’s children, we find significant differences in behavior between 
Jordanian children with and without Palestinian roots. While Jordanian children without 
Palestinian roots do display significant discrimination in favor of their in-group (and against 
the out-group comprising Syrian refugee children), we find that Jordanian children with 
Palestinian roots (whose parents, grandparents or great-grandparents were themselves 
refugees) do not discriminate at all between Jordanians and Syrians. While one may attribute 
this to a strong and shared refugee identity, note that this is by no means self-evident as more 
settled refugees or migrants have been reported to turn against newcomers.4  
Second, when we examine drivers of discrimination, we find a tight link between parents’ 
narratives and children’s discriminatory behavior for the Syrian (refugee) children. This 
suggests that discriminatory preferences are being transmitted through repeated narratives at 
home. More precisely, if Syrian parents think that Jordanians should do everything they can to 
                                                            
4 See, for example, Vila (2000), Moukarbel (2009), or Kalupe (2018). Further, Wilkes and Wu (2019) argue that 
the experience of being an immigrant, and being the subject of discrimination, can lead to a reduction in 
generalized trust. In general, the arrival of new immigrants or refugees can activate different responses by existing 
immigrant minorities. It can either induce the existing minority to distance themselves from the new arrivals and 
to try to assimilate more with the majority (see, e.g., Fouka, Mazumder, and Tabellini 2020), or, alternatively, it 
can prompt them to draw parallels with their personal family history which can induce increased empathy towards 
the new arrivals (Dinas, Fouka, and Schläpfer, 2019 and Williamson et al. 2020). Note, however, that these studies 
all examine attitudes expressed by adults. 
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help Syrian refugees in this humanitarian crisis, their children show a significantly larger 
degree of discrimination. 
Third, we also find evidence in favor of the contact hypothesis according to which ethnic 
conflict is ameliorated by social exposure to others (Allport 1954, Amir 1969, Corno, Burns 
and La Ferrara 2018, Paluck, Green and Green 2018, Rao 2019). In our Syrian sample, having 
more friends from the out-group reduces discrimination. 
Our paper contributes to several strands of literatures. First, it builds on the work studying 
the formation of pro-social preferences in children (e.g. Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach 2008, 
Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler, and Sutter 2013, Cavatorta, Zizzo, and Daoud 2020). The evidence for 
discriminatory behavior by kindergarten and pre-school students is somewhat mixed. List, List 
and Samek (2017) find no discrimination by three to five-year olds, while Bindra, Glätzle-
Rützler, and Lergetporer (2020) show that out-group discrimination emerges in a group of three 
to six-year olds and increases with age. Our experimental subjects’ age group of 9 to 10 years 
is most comparable to the studies by Angerer et al. (2016, 2017), which focus on primary 
school children (aged 7 to 11). They find discriminatory behavior among these primary school 
children from different language groups in Northern Italy. Yet none of the previously 
mentioned papers concerns refugee children or their parents’ attitudes towards the host country. 
A recent paper by Alan et al. (2020) is also related to our study. They study the integration of 
Syrian refugees in Turkey. The authors provide evidence that a perspective-taking intervention 
in schools where approximately one in five children are refugees lowers peer violence, social 
exclusion and ethnic segregation, thereby promoting pro-social behavior. They also study 
giving behavior but only explore whether there are differences in giving to a random recipient 
or a Syrian refugee child. They do not examine differences in behavior between refugee and 
host children and cannot explore the role of parents’ narratives for discrimination or whether 
children have a family history of refugee status, both of which are central contributions that we 
make to this literature on the economic preferences of children. 
Second, we relate to the literature studying refugee integration and the reaction of local 
communities to the sudden arrival of refugees. Several recent papers have studied the impact 
of refugee arrivals, showing, for example, that local Swedish residents avoided reading positive 
news about refugees (Freddi 2018). Exposure to refugees did not increase right-wing support 
in Germany (Schaub, Gereke, and Baldassarri 2019) and decreased it in Italy (Gamalerio et al. 
2019). In Northern Lebanon, increasing the salience of the “refugee crisis” reduced locals’ trust 
and prosocial preferences towards refugees (Hager and Valasek 2020) although this was 
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ameliorated by actual contact between members of the refugee and host population.5 
Alrababa’h et al. (2018) provide evidence complementary to ours, showing that personal 
exposure to economic impacts resulting from the refugee crisis is not associated with anti-
refugee sentiments among natives in Jordan. Yet all these studies relate to adult behavior and 
attitudes. For these adults, the inflow of refugees interacts with pre-existing attitudes to 
precipitate potential discriminatory behavior. In contrast, we study children who have grown 
up in the middle of the refugee crisis, which has spanned their formative years, and we ask how 
this has influenced the development of their pro-social preferences, specifically those relating 
to discrimination, as the latter can create a severe impediment for integration. 
In the following section, we present the background to our study and describe the 
experimental design and procedures. Results are presented in Section 3, and Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Experimental Setting, Design and Procedures 
 
The setting of our study, the Kingdom of Jordan, is geopolitically very important but also, at 
the same time, admittedly rather special due to its long history of absorbing refugees. 
Circassian immigration during the Ottoman occupation in the 19th century was the first notable 
wave, while Palestinians who lost their homelands in the Arab-Israeli wars formed the largest 
single contingent. Since the influx of Syrian refugees, Jordanians have been internationally 
commended for their generosity in hosting the Syrian refugees of which fewer than 20% live 
in camps. Jordan provides subsidized health care6 for all registered refugees and free schooling 
for all children, with children making up around half of the Syrian refugee population. Regular 
schooling has been achieved by establishing over two hundred double-shift schools that 
effectively operate two schools under one roof – one in the morning for Jordanians, one in the 
afternoon for Syrians (Albert et al. 2017).  
We conducted the experiment in 13 of these double-shift schools, all situated in the north 
of Jordan where the majority of Syrian refugees reside. In all, we had 456 participating children, 
232 from the morning shift and 224 from the afternoon shift. Additionally, we succeeded in 
                                                            
5 See Bertrand and Duflo (2017) for an informative recent review of field experiments relating to discrimination.  
6 Under severe financial duress, the Jordanian government had to reduce subsidies in early 2018. The fee for an 
emergency check-up is, however, still below JD 10 (approx. USD 14). 
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surveying 395 parents (one per child; covering 87% of the 456 children), 187 Jordanian parents 
of children from the morning shift, and 208 Syrian parents of children from the afternoon shift.7 
In the experiment, we implemented a sequence of three tasks.8 In each of the first two 
tasks subjects had to allocate five toys between themselves and another, anonymous child. In 
one task, the other child was from the same shift; in the other task, the other child was from the 
other shift. The sequence was randomized but as we do not find meaningful order effects9, we 
will report results using the pooled data below. In addition, we varied the salience of the two 
group identities in the instructions. In one condition we simply referred to children from the 
morning and afternoon shifts; in another we added the reminder that there are mainly Jordanian 
children in the morning shift and mainly Syrian children in the afternoon shift. This variation 
had no effect on behavior, from which we conclude that all children are perfectly aware of who 
attends the morning and afternoon shifts. This is not that surprising as the daily shift change 
features very prominently in the school routine, with one shift marching out of school while 
the next shift is approaching it (see Albert et al., 2017, where a video of the shift change can 
be found). In our results section below we focus on the pooled data.  
In the third task, a third-party allocation task, subjects had to allocate five toys between 
another child from the same shift and a child from the other shift, with both children unknown 
to the subject. They received five additional toys for themselves for completing this task, 
independently of their choice.  
In all three tasks, we opted to have an odd number of toys to remove the possibility of a 
50-50 split. Güth, Huck, and Müller (2001) show that equal splits have an appeal to participants 
over and above pure fairness considerations due to their focal nature. Of course, this forces 
subjects to favor one side over the other in each of the three tasks.  
                                                            
7 To be precise, it is not the case that all children in the morning shift are Jordanian and all children in the afternoon 
shift are Syrian. In our parent survey, 95% of morning shift parents report being Jordanian (and 2.7% Syrian), 
while 88% of the afternoon shift parents report being Syrian (and 7.7% Jordanian). In our analysis we keep the 
full samples because non-Jordanian children attending the morning shift are already more integrated into 
Jordanian society and non-Syrian children in the afternoon are also likely to have a refugee background. Our 
results are robust to the exclusion of these children. In the text below we shall, for the sake of expositional 
simplicity, refer to the children in the morning shift simply as Jordanians, and to children in the afternoon shift 
simply as Syrians.   
8 All tasks and rewards were piloted in a different double-shift school one week before the actual experiment. This 
allowed us to ensure that the children enjoyed receiving the different toys and to adjust the difficulty of the last 
task. After the three tasks described in detail here, we implemented a fourth task measuring grit in the spirit of 
Duckworth et al. (2007) and Alan, Boneva, and Ertac (2019). We do not report the results from this task here as 
they are orthogonal to the focus of this paper and unrelated to issues of discrimination. 
9 For example, when we consider our main comparisons of giving behavior (as in Table 1) and use a regression 
analysis to interact these decisions with a variable that denotes the order of decisions, all the interaction 
coefficients are insignificant.  
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All the children also completed two surveys which were part of a larger educational 
program financed by UNICEF and administered by Integrated International, an Amman-based 
consultancy specialized in program implementation and evaluation. Our experiment took place 
halfway between these two surveys.  
We conducted the experiment with the help of thirteen thoroughly trained enumerators. 
All enumerators had worked with Integrated International before and were experienced in 
administering surveys to children. Children were taken out of their classrooms to do the tasks 
one-on-one with the enumerators. This helped to ensure that the children fully understood the 
tasks and were not influenced by the other children in their class. Choices in the sharing tasks 
were made directly with the toys. After children had chosen their preferred allocation, the toys 
were put into A5-sized envelopes. The name of the decision-making child was written on one 
of the envelopes, while the envelopes for the passive receiving children remained blank. Note 
that the receiving children were different from the active decision-making children and that 
this was known to the active children; that is, they knew that they would not receive any 
rewards in addition to the rewards they received from their own choices. All envelopes were 
distributed at the end of the school day (or the following day in case decisions made in the 
afternoon were relevant for morning recipients). For more details on the procedures, see 
Appendix B. 
 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 Children’s Behavior: Main Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main descriptive statistics for the first three tasks and also provides 
some simple test statistics. The first column shows the average amounts given to the other child 
when the other child was in the same shift (giving to the in-group) and the second column 
shows the average amounts given to the other child when the other child was in the other shift 
(giving to the out-group). The third column shows test statics for the comparison between 
giving to the in- and out-group. The fourth column shows the average amount allocated to a 
child from the other shift in the third task in which participants divided five toys between 
someone from their own shift and another child from the other shift. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests for the first three tasks. 
 Task 1 and 2 
Giving to  
In-Group# 
Tasks 1 and 2 
Giving to  
Out-Group# 
p (Diff > 0) Task 3 
Allocation to 
Out-Group† 
N 
Morning Shift 
(Jordanians) 
2.35 
(0.67) 
2.25 
(0.69) 
0.043 2.28 
(0.56) 
232 
Afternoon Shift 
(Syrians) 
2.43 
(0.69) 
2.35 
(0.59) 
0.076 2.25 
(0.63) 
224 
p (Diff ≠ 0) 
 
0.19 0.10 -0.016‡/p = 0.84 0.53  
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
# Children were given five toys to distribute between themselves and another child in the respective shift. The 
figures in these columns report how many out of those five toys were given to the other child (with the rest kept 
by the decision-making child). 
† Children had to allocate five toys between a child from their own shift and a child from the other shift. The 
figures report how many toys were given to the child from the other shift (with 5 minus this figure given to the 
child from their own shift on average). 
‡ This figure indicates the difference between the two shifts with respect to the difference between in-group and 
out-group allocation in tasks 1 and 2. It is not significant. 
 
 
We make the following observations.  
 
(1) Our subjects, from both the morning and the afternoon shifts, are unusually generous. 
All relevant models of social preferences (such as Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000, or Charness and Rabin, 2002, to name just a few) suggest that subjects 
will allocate at least 3 toys to themselves since disadvantageous inequality is assumed 
to hurt more than advantageous inequality. This means that on average we should see 
at most 2 toys being allocated to the other child. In contrast, what we observe is that the 
recipient children get between 2.25 and 2.43 toys on average. We observe 41.1% [resp. 
33.0%] of subjects in the morning shift allocating more to the other child than to 
themselves when the recipient is in the in- [out-] group. The corresponding numbers for 
the afternoon shift are 45.3% [42.7%].  
(2) While discrimination is (partly) statistically significant, the magnitudes of the 
differences between giving to the in- and out-group are small (0.1 for the morning shift, 
0.08 for the afternoon shift). The level of discrimination is indistinguishable between 
Jordanian and Syrian children (as a p-value of 0.84 indicates). 
(3) In the third-party allocation task subjects make, on average, choices that are very similar 
to their choices in tasks 1 and 2 where self-interest is involved. Specifically, they treat 
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a child from the same shift versus a child from the other shift similarly to how they treat 
themselves versus another child. Notice, however, that again the average allocated to 
the other shift is above 2 for both the morning and afternoon shifts. In the morning shift, 
28.1% of subjects favor the child from the other shift over the child from their own 
shift; in the afternoon it is 25.9%. Again, we see no differences between Jordanian and 
Syrian children in the third-party allocation task (p = 0.53). 
 
3.2 Parents’ Narratives 
 
When communities or entire nations experience a departure from life as usual (e.g. due to a 
refugee crisis), the collective effort to make sense of events often results in multiple narratives 
being propagated through society (see, e.g., Boudes and Laroche 2009, Innes 2010, Blinder 
and Allen 2016, Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017, Eberl et al. 2018). It is plausible that a 
parent’s interpretation of the refugee crisis and its impact on daily life is transmitted to their 
children, thereby influencing whether they display discriminatory sharing behavior. To provide 
evidence on this, we collected measures of the parents’ perceptions of the crisis. In particular, 
we asked parents to assess their agreement with the following four statements on a scale from 
1 (totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree): 
 
i. “The Syrian crisis is a tragedy, and Jordanians should do everything they can to help 
the Syrian refugees, irrespective of the costs.” 
ii. “Jordanians have already done so much for the Syrian refugees; it is time for other 
countries to do more to help.” 
iii. “The Syrian crisis has increased housing rental prices in Jordan.” 
iv. “The Syrian crisis has made it more difficult to find jobs in Jordan.” 
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Table 2: Parents’ perceptions of the refugee crisis: Average agreement on a scale from 1 
(totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree) 
Perception Morning Shift 
(Jordanians) 
Afternoon Shift 
(Syrians) 
p (Diff ≠ 0) 
(i) Jordanians morally obliged 7.4 8.1 <0.01 
     to help (2.2) (1.9) 
 
(ii) Jordan has done enough 8.7 9.0 0.22 
 (1.8) (1.6) 
 
(iii) Rental prices increased 8.2 8.6 0.04 
 (2.1) (1.8) 
 
(iv) Jobs more difficult to find 7.9 8.0 0.72 
  (2.5) (2.2)   
    
N 187 208   
 Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the average response to each of these questions by the parents of Jordanian 
and Syrian children (the full distributions are shown in Figure A.1 in Appendix A). The main 
observation is that, overall, the two groups of parents share a relatively similar understanding 
of the crisis. One major difference is observed in the degree to which the parents assess the 
refugee crisis as being a tragedy implying a moral imperative that Jordanians should do 
everything they can to assist. On this dimension, Syrian parents are more strongly in favor than 
their Jordanian counterparts. However, both sets of parents agree to the same degree that 
Jordanians have done enough to help and that jobs are more difficult to find as a consequence 
of the Syrian crisis. Both groups find themselves agreeing that housing prices increased as a 
consequence of the crisis, with a slightly but significantly stronger sentiment measured for the 
Syrians which is probably due to a larger fraction of renters among them.  
 
3.3 Covariates of Discrimination: The Role of Parents’ Narratives, Family History, and 
Social Contact 
 
Although, on average, children do not discriminate a lot between their in- and out-group in our 
data, we want to understand how discrimination depends on various covariates. In particular, 
we want to examine the role of parents’ narratives of the refugee crisis, the impact of a family 
history as refugees, and the relevance of the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954, Amir 1969) 
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which predicts less discrimination by those who are exposed to more contact with the out-
group.  
For this purpose, we regress an overall measure of discrimination obtained from our three 
tasks on children’s characteristics and their parents’ narratives. Specifically, to construct our 
discrimination measure, we sum the following two objects: (i) the difference between the 
amount given to a recipient from the in-group and the amount given to a recipient from the out-
group in tasks 1 and 2, and (ii) the difference between the amount allocated to an in-group child 
and the amount allocated to an out-group child in task 3 (divided by 2). 
 
Table 3: Covariates of Discrimination for Jordanian Children 
 Dependent variable: Discrimination (Jordanian Children, Morning Shift) 
 [1] Contact [2] Parental Perceptions [3] Full Model 
Time going to that school (yrs) 0.026 (0.083)   0.014 (0.081) 
Outgroup-friends at school (=1) -0.035 (0.177)   -0.059 (0.195) 
Number of outgroup-friends 0.053 (0.129)   0.045 (0.126) 
Outgroup-friends at school (=1)  
     × Number of outgroup-
friends 
-0.035 (0.136)   -0.010 (0.136) 
Having Syrian relatives (=1) -0.609 (0.438)   -0.660 (0.441) 
Having Palestinian roots (=1) -0.322** (0.151)   -0.347** (0.153) 
Jordanians have to help   0.025 (0.039) 0.035 (0.041) 
Jordan has done enough   -0.025 (0.045) -0.063 (0.048) 
Rental prices increased   0.058 (0.039) 0.062 (0.039) 
Jobs more difficult to find   -0.032 (0.031) -0.032 (0.030) 
Constant 0.433** (0.213) 0.132 (0.412) 0.510 (0.522) 
Wald test: F statistic (p-value) a 2.24 (.137) .1 (.752)   
R^2 0.045  0.018  0.068  
Observationsb 178  187  178  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
a Column [1] reports results for testing the linear combination "Outgroup-friends at school (=1)" + "Number of 
outgroup-friends" + "Outgroup-friends at school (=1) x Number of outgroup-friends" + "Having Syrian relatives 
(=1)" = 0. Column [2] reports results for testing the linear combination "Jordanians morally obliged to help" - 
"Jordan has done enough" - "Rental prices increased" - "Jobs more difficult to find" = 0. 
b Nine parents did not indicate either whether they had Syrian relatives or Palestinian roots, which explains the 
lower number of observations in some columns. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 3 shows our estimation results for the morning shift (Jordanian children) and Table 4 for 
the afternoon shift (Syrian children). The first column in both tables contains estimates for the 
contact variables that we elicited when we were asking for the existence and number of friends 
from the outgroup. Moreover, for the Jordanians, we asked whether they have Syrian relatives 
or Palestinian roots, with the latter indicating a family history of having descended from 
refugees themselves. The second column contains parents’ narratives and the third column 
combines the two.  
 
Table 4: Covariates of Discrimination for Syrian Children 
 Dependent variable: Discrimination (Syrian Children – Afternoon Shift) 
 [1] Contact [2] Parental Attitudes [3] Full Model 
Time going to that school (yrs) -0.081 (0.110)   -0.099 (0.109) 
Outgroup-friends at school (=1) 0.155 (0.221)   0.061 (0.225) 
Number of outgroup-friends -0.042* (0.024)   -0.043* (0.024) 
Outgroup-friends at school (=1)  
     × Number of outgroup-friends 
0.033 (0.042)   0.043 (0.045) 
Having Jordanian relatives (=1) -0.099 (0.207)   -0.112 (0.206) 
Distance from origin to Amman 
(in 100km) 
-0.047 (0.057)   -0.062 (0.056) 
Time in Jordan (yrs) 
 
-0.029 (0.105)   -0.018 (0.103) 
Jordanians have to help   0.082* (0.046) 0.086* (0.051) 
Jordan has done enough   -0.117** (0.055) -0.122** (0.061) 
Rental prices increased   0.041 (0.047) 0.047 (0.050) 
Jobs more difficult to find   -0.070** (0.035) -0.069* (0.038) 
Constant 0.888 (0.758) 0.946* (0.503) 1.470* (0.852) 
Wald testa: F statistic (p-value) .003 (.955) 5.648** (.018)   
R^2 0.020  0.039  0.064  
Observationsb 174  208  174  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
a Column [1] reports results for testing the linear combination "Time going to that school (yrs)" + "Outgroup-
friends at school (=1)" + "Number of outgroup-friends" + "Outgroup-friends at school (=1) x Number of outgroup-
friends" + "Having Jordanian relatives (=1)" - "Distance from origin to Amman (in 100km)" + "Time in Jordan 
(yrs)" = 0. Column [2] reports results for testing the linear combination "Jordanians have to help" - "Jordan has 
done enough" - "Rental prices increased" - "Jobs more difficult to find" = 0. 
b For some parents we don’t have information on their origin in Syria and whether or not they have relatives in 
Jordan, which explains the lower number of observations in some columns. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Three findings stand out from this exercise. 
(1) Jordanian children with Palestinian roots discriminate significantly less against Syrians 
than other Jordanians. In fact, examining the estimates in detail, we find that Jordanian 
children with Palestinian roots do not discriminate at all. It appears that their shared 
refugee identity substantially increases solidarity with other refugee children. We 
consider this to be perhaps the most striking finding of our study.  
(2) For the Syrian population we find a tight link between parents’ narratives and children’s 
discriminatory behavior with three of the four perception variables being significant 
and having signs in the directions one would expect.10 When parents think that “Jordan 
has done enough” and that, as a consequence of the refugee influx, “jobs are more 
difficult to find” their children discriminate less. On the other hand, if they agree more 
strongly with the statement that “the crisis is a tragedy, and Jordanians should do 
everything they can to help the Syrian refugees”, their children discriminate more. For 
the Jordanian population we do not find such effects.  
(3) There is some, but limited evidence for the contact hypothesis. Syrian children in the 
afternoon shift discriminate less when they have more out-group (i.e., Jordanian) 
friends. On the other hand, there is no evidence for the contact hypothesis in our sample 
of Jordanian children.  
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Our study shows that there is remarkably little discrimination among Jordanian and Syrian 
refugee children who attend double-shift schools in the Kingdom of Jordan. This is coupled 
with very high levels of generosity towards others. Both findings contrast sharply with similar 
experiments in Western settings (see, e.g., Sutter, Zoller, Glätzle-Rützler 2019 for a survey). 
One caveat of our results is that our experimental design does not allow us to isolate the 
underlying reason for this observed generosity (and thereby provide a complete explanation for 
the difference in relation to Western settings). However, a shared religion, culture and 
language, as well as Bedouin hospitality culture and the Kingdom of Jordan’s history of 
absorbing and integrating refugees are all factors that may contribute to the striking pattern.11 
                                                            
10 We conjectured that narratives that stress the burden refugees impose on Jordanians would reduce 
discrimination, while narratives that stress Syrian entitlement would increase discrimination.  
11 See Alshoubaki and Harris (2018) for the role of such factors for successful integration of Syrians in Jordan. 
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Differentiating between these potential drivers of pro-social behavior in a cross-country setting 
could be an exciting avenue for future research. 
The data collected from our experiment and the correspondent survey does, however, 
allow us to contribute to the understanding of the channels that drive differences in pro-social 
attitudes and non-discriminating behavior within the population we sample from (as opposed 
to explaining the high baseline level we observe throughout). For Syrian children we find that 
both contact – as measured by the number of out-group friends – and narratives at homes – as 
measured by parents’ narratives relating to the refugee crisis – shape discrimination. None of 
these measures are correlated with the behavior of the Jordanian children, pointing to a 
remarkable asymmetry between the refugee and host population. This asymmetry is perhaps 
not that surprising in light of the fact that the lives of the Syrian families in our sample have 
been much more dramatically altered than the lives of the Jordanian families. It appears 
plausible that narratives about the refugee situation play a more fundamental role for Syrians 
than for Jordanians and that making friends with “the others” is of more pronounced 
psychological and material importance for refugees than it is for hosts.  
Perhaps most important is our key finding for the Jordanian population, where we 
observe that children with Palestinian roots do not discriminate at all against Syrian children. 
Clearly, family history (going back over fifty years) matters for the pro-social behavior of the 
children we observe. It appears that already our 9 to 10-year old subjects, whose parents, grand-
parents or grand-grand-parents lost their homes in the 1948 or 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, have 
been instilled with a refugee identity that generates solidarity with other refugee children. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
A Additional Figures 
 
Figure A.1: Distribution of responses to questions discussed in Table 2 
 
Agreement with statement coded from 1 (totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree). 
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B Sample Version of the Instructions (Morning Shift, First Sharing Task with Morning 
Shift, No Salience of Group Identity) 
General instructions for the enumerator are italicized 
[(Sub-)Headings and information not to be read out loud are written in brackets] 
Hello, my name is XY. The participation in this game is voluntary. I will explain you how it 
works and then ask you, if you want to participate – is that fine for you? (If child wants to hear 
the instructions, go on with instructions; if child wants to stop already now, then bring the child 
back to the classroom and enter the child’s decision appropriately into the tablet).  
In the four games we play today, you will get some gifts. Depending on your decisions, other 
children will also get some gifts. Those gifts I will put into these envelopes later (show the 
three envelopes; one for the participant, one for a child from the same shift and one for a child 
from the other shift); and you will get your gifts at the end of the shift; but I will explain you 
all details later. Now let me first write your name on the one where I will store your gifts (write 
participant’s name + father’s name + family name + grade + ‘M’/’A’ (depending on shift) on 
his / her envelope; also label other envelopes with ‘M’ and ‘A’, but do not talk about the 
meaning of the ‘M’ and ‘A’ yet). One gift I will put in the envelope right now, this you can 
keep irrespective of whether you participate or not (put big toy in the envelope). 
[Game 1] 
In this game you can earn gifts. This is the gift you receive in this game (show participant gift 
for the first game). You will receive your gifts after this shift. More details I will explain to 
you later.  
[The partner] 
In the first part of this game you can send gifts to another child who attends school in your shift 
at your own school. The other child is randomly selected from another class. Your partner is a 
child of about your age. Your partner does not know who exactly you are.  
[The Game] 
The first part of the game works as follows: (lay down the first card (labelled ‘Card 1 - green: 
Games 1 and 2’) on the table, place grey and green playing pieces on them) On this card you 
can see your partner (point to the partner’s playing piece). As I told you before, you may earn 
gifts in this game. But only you get five gifts at the beginning (five gifts for the first game are 
placed in front of the grey playing piece corresponding to the participating child) that you can 
share with your partner. Your partner does not get any gifts that she or he can share with you. 
Therefore, you will not receive any gifts from your partner, as they have nothing to share with 
you. You have to decide how many gifts you want to take for yourself and how many gifts you 
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want to send to your partner. That means you have to decide, whether you would like to send 
ZERO, ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR or FIVE of your gifts to your partner, who attends school 
in the same shift as you do (the morning shift) (when listing the possibilities of decision making, 
use the gifts to illustrate). If you want to send for example TWO gifts, then you have to move 
two of the gifts to your partner (move two gifts to the other playing piece). In that case you send 
two gifts away (two gifts from the own (grey) playing piece are pushed away to the middle), 
and your partner receives those two gifts (now place the two gifts next to the other playing 
piece). You will keep three gifts. Can you tell me what happens if you would like to send FOUR 
gifts to your partner? (reallocate the gifts to get the original allocation; the participant has to 
explain: (i) participant sends four gifts away (ii) partner gets four gifts (iii) participant keeps 
one gift) And what happens if you send nothing? (the participant has to explain: (i) participant 
sends no gift away (ii) partner gets nothing (iii) participant keeps all five gifts)  
Your partner really exists and will receive the gifts at the end of this shift; therefore I have an 
envelope for your partner here as well (show the envelope for the corresponding partner). We 
will put your gifts in an envelope that you will get at the end of the shift.  
[Understanding] 
Now let’s see what you can still remember. Could you please repeat the rules concerning the 
gifts in your own words, what can you do with them and what happens? (Participant has to 
repeat: (i) the participant can send between zero and five gifts to the partner (ii) the partner 
receives those gifts, the participant will keep the remaining gifts and not receive any gifts from 
the partner; if the participant does not repeat all the points alone, then ask questions) 
Can you please repeat when and how you get your gifts today in your own words? (Participant 
has to repeat: (i) the participant gets the gifts in the envelope labelled with his / her name after 
the shift; (ii) the partner also gets gifts in the corresponding envelope). 
Do you also remember who your partner is? (The following points have to be repeated: (i) the 
partner is randomly selected (ii) the partner attends school in the same shift (the morning shift), 
but in another class (iii) The partner is represented by a green playing piece (iv) the partner is 
about the same age as the participant (v) the participant receives no other information on the 
partners (vi) the partners do not know the identity of the child; if the participant does not repeat 
all the points alone, then ask questions). 
[Consent] 
Okay, now tell me: Do you want to participate? (If child wants to participate go on with the 
instructions; if child does not want to participate then bring the child back to the classroom 
and enter the child’s decision appropriately into the tablet). 
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[The Decision] 
Good, then you can make your decision (point at the card laying on the table). Remember that 
your partner attends school in the same shift as you do (the morning shift). It is very important 
that your decisions are secret. Your partner will not know that it was you who was deciding in 
this game, they will just receive the envelope. The decision is your secret. Now please take as 
much time as you need for your decision. I will turn around in the meantime so that you are 
not disturbed. Call me when you are ready (when participant calls, turn towards the 
participant). 
[After the decision] 
(After the decision the enumerator has to check if the child took a valid decision. If something 
is wrong, ask participant to correct. Enter decision into the tablet (this is Game 1) and put the 
gifts in the appropriate envelope: gifts allocated to the participant into the envelope labelled 
with his / her name and gifts allocated to the partner into a not yet used envelope for either the 
morning or the afternoon shift, depending on when the partner attends school).  
Thank you for your decision. Now I have a question. How many gifts do you think would your 
partner send to you, if she or he had received five gifts from us to play the game you just 
played? (Enter answer into the tablet (this is Game 1))  
[Game 2] 
Okay, now let’s play another game.  
[The partner] 
The game works exactly the same as with your partner before. The only difference is that now 
you play with another partner and that you can earn different gifts. Now you can earn those 
gifts (show participant gift for the second game). First we need another playing card (lay down 
the other playing card for Game 1/Game 2 (labelled ‘Card 1 - blue: Games 1 and 2’) on the 
table, place grey and blue playing pieces on them) The partner you are now playing with (point 
at the partner’s playing piece) is a child who attends school in the other shift, i.e. the afternoon 
shift, and we use a blue playing piece for her / him. As before, your partner is randomly selected 
and does not know who exactly you are.  
[The game] 
Ok, and do you remember the rules of the game? (If participant is unsure or hesitates, ask if 
anything should be explained again or quickly repeat: (i) the participant can send between 
zero and five gifts to the partner (ii) the partner receives those gifts, the participant will keep 
the remaining gifts and not receive any gifts from the partner) 
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As before, your partner really exists and will receive the gifts at the end of this shift; therefore 
I also have an envelope for this partner here (show the envelope for the corresponding partner)  
[Understanding] 
And can you repeat who your partner is? 
(The following point has to be repeated: the partner attends school in the other shift, i.e. the 
afternoon shift, and is represented by a blue playing piece; if the participant does not the point 
alone, then ask questions). 
[Decision] 
Good, then you can make your decision. Remember that your partner attends the other shift, 
i.e. the afternoon shift and that it is very important that your decisions are secret. Your partner 
will not know that it was you who was deciding in this game, they will just receive the envelope. 
The decision is your secret. Now please take as much time as you need for your decision. I will 
turn around in the meantime so that you are not disturbed. Call me when you are ready (when 
participant calls, turn towards the participant). 
[After the decision] 
(After the decision the enumerator has to check if the child took a valid decision. If something 
is wrong, ask participant to correct. Enter decision into the tablet (this is Game 2) and put the 
gifts in the appropriate envelope: gifts allocated to the participant into the envelope labelled 
with his / her name and gifts allocated to the partner into a not yet used envelope for either the 
morning or the afternoon shift, depending on when the partner attends school). 
Thank you for your decision. Now I again have a question. How many gifts do you think would 
your partner in this second part send to you, if she or he had received gifts from us to play the 
game you just played? (Enter answer into the tablet (this is Game 2))  
[Game 3] 
Now let’s play another game. In this game, you have to distribute gifts between two other 
children, but you cannot keep any of those gifts for yourself. Because this is a challenging task, 
you get five gifts of those gifts yourself – irrespective of how you distribute the gifts between 
your partners (show participant the gifts for the third game). Look, I am putting the five gifts 
into your envelope now. [put five gifts into the envelope with the participant’s name written on 
it] 
[The partners] 
We have the same two partners from the last two games, the one from your shift, and the one 
from the other shift (lay down the second card (labelled ‘Card 2: Game 3’) on the table):  
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Here is the green playing piece, and here is the blue playing piece (playing pieces are placed 
in front of the participant on the second card on their corresponding positions). 
As before, the green playing piece (point to the green playing piece) is for your partner from 
before who attends school in your shift, i.e. the morning shift, and the blue partner (point to the 
blue playing piece) is for your partner from before who attends school in the other shift, i.e. the 
afternoon shift. 
[The game] 
The game works as follows: 
On this card you can see a green playing piece for the partner from your shift and a blue playing 
piece for the partner from the other shift (point to the green and blue playing pieces). This 
means that you are now deciding for your green and blue partners. Five gifts (five gifts are 
placed between the green playing piece and the blue playing piece) have to be distributed 
between your green and your blue partners.  
The distribution of gifts works exactly as before, only that you now distribute gifts between 
your green and your blue partner.  
[Understanding] 
Okay, so can you please repeat what you will get in this game, what you have to do and what 
that means to your partners? (The following points have to be repeated: 
 (i) the child will earn five gifts for taking a decision on behalf of the others, that is (ii) 
distributing the five gifts between them (iii) recipients of the gifts that the participant has to 
distribute will be other children). 
And do you still remember who your partners are? (If participant is unsure or hesitates, repeat 
the following points:  
(i) the partner with the green playing piece attends school the same shift, i.e. the morning shift 
 (ii) the partner with the blue playing piece attends school in the other shift, i.e. the afternoon 
shift 
[Decision] 
Now you can make your decisions (point at the card on the table with the green and blue 
playing pieces). Remember that your green partner (point to the green playing piece) attends 
school in your shift, i.e. the morning shift, and that your blue partner (point to the blue playing 
piece) attends school in the other shift, i.e. the afternoon shift. It is very important that your 
decisions are secret. Your partners will not know that it was you who was deciding in this 
game, they will just receive the envelopes.  The decision is your secret.  
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Please take as much time as you need for your decisions. I will turn around in the meantime so 
that you are not disturbed. Call me when you are ready (when participant calls, turn towards 
the participant). 
[After the decision] 
(After the decision the enumerator has to check if the child took a valid decision. If something 
is wrong, ask participant to correct. Enter decision into the tablet (this is Game 3) and put the 
gifts in the appropriate envelope: gifts allocated to each partner into their envelopes that have 
been used for them before).  
Thank you for your decision.  
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